Real Estate

November 19, 2024

Indiana Supreme Court Clarifies Compensation Owed in Takings Relating to Road Construction

by Parr Richey Frandsen Patterson Kruse LLP

In October 2024, the Indiana Supreme Court held that property owners cannot recover damages for traffic flow reduction to their property caused by roadway projects if the project leaves the property’s access points unchanged because no taking of a property right would occur.[1]

As part of new I-69 construction, the state in 2019 sought to purchase a narrow strip of land from an undeveloped parcel belonging to Franciscan where another nearby property owner, SCP, owned a drainage easement for its CVS storefront.[2] The new interstate would also remove the nearest intersection, which would soon place plaintiffs’ properties at the dead-end of a road and abutting the new interstate.[3] Unsuccessful in negotiations, the state filed for eminent domain, and plaintiffs asserted damages including a reduction in their properties’ commercial value.[4] The state, in turn, argued that damages stemming from traffic reduction are barred as a matter of law.[5] The trial court disagreed, leading to a jury verdict over two million dollars.[6] The Court of Appeals reversed the jury determination of damages for error, and the Supreme Court granted transfer.[7]

When an Indiana government entity uses eminent domain to take property, it owes compensation to the property owner including “‘fair market value’” and “damages ‘to the residue of the property’ that the owner retains.”[8] But a compensable taking requires taking a property right.[9] While condemning the narrow strip of property at hand indisputably created a taking, the traffic issues arising from removing the nearby intersection required a separate analysis.[10]

January 23, 2019

INDIANA COURT OF APPEALS HOLDS ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE EXISTS AGAINST SLANDER OF TITLE WHEN LIS PENDENS NOTICE PROPERLY FILED AND ARGUMENT NOT WAIVED UPON APPEAL

by Parr Richey Frandsen Patterson Kruse LLP

On January 11, 2019, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly denied appellant RCM Phoenix Partners LLC’s (“Phoenix”) slander of title claim, even though the appellee 2007 East Meadows, LP (“Meadows”) failed to raise a claim of absolute privilege at the trial court level and raised it for the first time on appeal.

Due to complications surrounding an assignment of a purchase agreement and assumption of an existing mortgage of an apartment community (“Property”) to Meadows, the parties were unable to close on the Property. Meadows sued Phoenix in Texas, alleging that Phoenix breached the purchase agreement and committed fraud. Meadows filed a lis pendens notice against the property of the pending Texas lawsuit. The trial court in Texas dismissed the lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction, but a second suit in Indiana, where Phoenix countersued and added a slander of title claim to its complaint continued. In Meadows’ answer, it did not assert that the lis pendens notice was privileged. Meadows first raised the claim of absolute privilege upon Phoenix’s appeal of a trial court decision that found in favor of Phoenix’s claim for retention of the earnest money but found in favor of Meadows for the slander of title claim.

The Court of Appeals noted that while the general rule is that an argument or issue raised for the first time on appeal is waived and thus ineligible for appellate review, the trend in recent Indiana Supreme Court cases is to allow an appellee seeking affirmance of a trial court’s judgment to defend the trial court’s ruling on any basis, including with arguments not raised at trial. Here, because Meadows was the appellee and sought an affirmance of the trial court’s decision to deny the slander of title claim, the Court of Appeals held that Meadows had not waived the right to argue that it had absolute privilege from a slander of title claim.

September 15, 2016

BOUNDARY TREES IN INDIANA: OWNERSHIP, RESPONSIBILITY AND OTHER RELATED TOPICS

by Parr Richey Frandsen Patterson Kruse LLP

Trees can be assets or a nuisance, depending on one’s perspective and situation. While they may provide shade, privacy or other value to one person, they may interfere with a neighbor’s enjoyment and safe use of his own property.

Questions often arise about the ownership of trees growing on or near the boundary between adjoining properties. Which landowner is responsible for their care or removal? If there is disagreement over what is needed, whose interests should have priority? The answers depend on the circumstances and equities of the situation. And because state laws and local ordinances often differ, they can also vary depending on the particular jurisdiction hearing the case. But, in general, the analysis begins with a determination of the tree’s ownership.

In Indiana, the rights and responsibility for a tree’s care is vested in its owner, and ownership is determined solely by the location of the tree’s trunk. The author presumes the location is made at ground level, but that point is not always clear in the case law. If the trunk of the tree is entirely on Brown’s land — even if its limbs and branches extend across the boundary line or its roots encroach onto Smith’s land – the law typically considers the tree to be the property of Brown. Absent a contract or easement that grants property rights in the tree to another person, Brown has the exclusive right to decide whether to preserve it or cut it down. That generally is true regardless of Brown’s motivation in doing so or the impact the tree’s removal may have on neighboring property. See, Luke v. Scott, 187 N.E. 63 (Ind. Ct.App. 1933).

January 26, 2012

Indiana Creditor’s Laws New Indiana Case Clarifying Notices of Sheriff’s Sale By: Jeremy L. Fetty

by Parr Richey Frandsen Patterson Kruse LLP

In Surrisi v. Bremner, a 2011 Indiana Court of Appeals decision, the court held the Bill of Sale issued to the buyer (Bremner) invalid, as the Bill of Sale named business personal property which was not included in the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale.

Bremner, a creditor of the sellers (Surrisis), was the highest bidder at the Sheriff’s Sale and the sheriff issued a Bill of Sale that included business personal property that was not included in the Notice of Sale. The court noted that although the Agreed Judgment between the two parties stated the Sheriff’s Sale would include both real and personal property, the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale, praecipe of sale, and tax documentation, only listed the real property as being sold at the sale. Relying on a 2000 Colorado Court of Appeals decision, the court found that no notice of sale was given with respect to the business personal property, so such property could not have been sold at the sheriff’s sale. The court also stated that nothing in the settlement agreement prevented the business personal property from being sold at another sheriff’s sale, leading the court to further presume that only real property was to be sold at the Sheriff’s Sale in question.

Jeremy Fetty is a partner in the law firm of Parr Richey Frandsen Patterson Kruse with offices in Lebanon and Indianapolis. He often advises businesses and utilities (for profit, non-profit and cooperative) on organizational, human resources, and transactional matters and drafts and reviews commercial contracts.