Indiana Business Lawyer Blog

January 16, 2019

Co-ops are the Exception: Private Inurement Does NOT Apply – “Application of the Private Inurement Doctrine to Tax-Exempt Cooperatives”

by Parr Richey Frandsen Patterson Kruse LLP

Both the IRS excess benefit statute and the private inurement doctrine DO NOT apply to tax-exempt cooperatives. 26 U.S.C. § 4958(c) defines an excess benefit transaction as “any transaction in which an economic benefit is provided by an applicable tax-exempt organization directly or indirectly to or for the use of any disqualified person.” For the purposes of this statute, an applicable tax-exempt corporation includes “any organization which…would be described in 501(3),(4), or (29)…” See 26 U.S.C. § 4958(e). As far as private inurement goes, the general rule is that no one private individual may benefit (i.e. receive earnings) from a charitable organization. (See Treas. Reg. Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2)). Allowing such inurement would run contrary to notion that many charitable organizations are set up for the benefit of the public, not individuals. However, coops are the exception to this doctrine. Indeed, tax-exempt organizations under 501(c)(12) do not share the same purpose as 501(c)(3)-(4) corporations. Unlike charitable corporations est. via 501(c)(3), coops organized under 501(c)(12) are set up precisely to benefit their members, who are almost always private individuals. Thus, application of the private inurement doctrine to tax-exempt cooperatives does not seem consistent with their established purpose.

James A. L. Buddenbaum has practiced law for more than 25 years with Parr Richey representing municipalities and businesses in utility, healthcare and general business sectors in both regulatory and transactional matters. Jim also has extensive experience in representing businesses in making large property damage and similar insurance claims.

The statements contained here are matters of opinion for general information purposes only and should not be considered by anyone as forming an attorney client relationship or advice for any particular legal matter of the reader. All readers should obtain legal advice for any specific legal matters.

December 18, 2018

Wolfe v. Flathead Elec. Coop., Inc. – Patronage Capital Refunds

by Parr Richey Frandsen Patterson Kruse LLP

A group of four former cooperative members filed a breach of contract claim against Flathead Electric Cooperative. Wolfe v. Flathead Elec. Coop., Inc., 393 Mont. 312, 314 (Mont. 2018).Plaintiffs were members of the coop during various times, the latest of which was in 2007. Plaintiffs alleged that Flathead violated Montana law when it allocated patronage capital to their accounts, but did not actually refund any capital to the members on an annual basis. The Federal District Court of Montana mentioned that plaintiff’s claim would not likely prevail, as the statute governing capital refunds only requires that refunds be distributed “whenever the revenue exceeds the amount necessary to fund operations.” Id. However, the district court did not ultimately reach this question. Instead, it ruled that Plaintiffs did not file their claim within the applicable 8-year statute of limitations. Id. at 315.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Montana affirmed. Id. at 313. When bringing a claim under a written contract, the statute of limitations runs from the moment a plaintiff’s claim accrues. Id. at 315. The Court held that Plaintiffs’ claim had accrued in February, 2008, as this was the date of the last board meeting that took place while Plaintiffs were still members of the cooperative. Id. at 315-16. Their complaint was filed in September, 2016 – 8-and-a-half years after their claim had accrued. Thus, the statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim had expired. Id. at 316.

The court rejected plaintiff’s argument of fraudulent concealment, which would have tolled the statute of limitations until the time of discovery. Id. Flathead had a defined policy regarding patronage capital in their bylaws, and the Court did not find that it took any affirmative action to deceive Plaintiffs. Id. at 317. The Court also rejected the Plaintiff’s assertion that the breach is ongoing, holding that the latest any Plaintiff was a member was up to the board meeting of 2008, and that Plaintiffs had knowledge of the breach from that point onward. Id. at 316.

November 5, 2018

State Allowed to Offer Energy Generation Facilities Subsidies – “Electric Power Supply Association, et al., v. Anthony M. Star, Director of Illinois Power Agency, et al., 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 25980 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 2018)”

by Parr Richey Frandsen Patterson Kruse LLP

On September 13, 2018, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an Illinois law, 20 ILSC 3855/1-75(d-5), who provides subsidies to some of the state’s struggling nuclear generation facilities, against a challenge by the Electric Power Supply Association (EPSA), an advocacy group for the electric power industry.

Under the Federal Power Act, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is authorized to regulate the sale of electricity in interstate commerce while states regulate local distribution of electricity, as well as the facilities used to generate it. In this case, EPSA argued that the Illinois law was preempted by the Federal Power Act because the subsidies indirectly regulated the price of power, which only FERC has the authority to regulate.

The Seventh Circuit explained that the states’ and FERC’s powers under the Federal Power Act often overlap; it would be impossible for states to regulate the local distribution of electricity without at least affecting the price of power within its borders. If a state were to offer subsidies that depended on selling power in interstate auction, then the legislation would be preempted. However, the Illinois law in this case only regulates local generation of power. Thus, the court found no preemption and the law was upheld.

November 1, 2018

IN Supreme Court Rules: Fantasy Sports Do NOT Need Permission to Use Athletes Real Names – “Daniels v. FanDuel, Inc.”

by Parr Richey Frandsen Patterson Kruse LLP

On Thursday, Oct. 24, the Indiana Supreme Court answered a vital question surrounding online fantasy sports sites: Does a fantasy sports site need permission before it uses a player’s name and statistics in its online fantasy game? The Indiana Supreme Court answered no to this question, falling in line with the national trend of decisions favoring sports betting.

Former collegiate athletes Akeem Daniels, Cameron Stingily, and Nicholas Stoner brought a class-action suit against FanDuel, Inc. and DraftKings, Inc., claiming that the use of their names and likenesses in the defendants’ online fantasy sports game violated plaintiffs’ right to publicity under Ind. Code § 32-36-1-8(a). Daniels, No. 18S-CQ-00134 at 3. Indiana’s right of publicity statute generally prohibits the use of a person’s name or likeness for commercial gain without the consent. Id. at 4. Defendants removed the case to federal court, and then filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that their use of plaintiffs’ names and likeness fall within one of the statutes various exceptions. Id. at 3. Specifically, Defendant’s asserted that plaintiffs’ permission was not required because the information used on their site fell within the “political or newsworthy” exception, as well as the “public interest” exception to the statute. Id. at 5. The Southern District of Indiana dismissed plaintiffs’ suit, finding that both of these exceptions applied. Id. at 3. Plaintiffs appealed to the 7th Circuit. Id. Because case law applying Indiana’s right to publicity statute was sparse, the 7th Circuit certified the question to the Indiana Supreme Court, asking if an athlete’s permission is required in this circumstance. Id.

The Indiana Supreme Court’s opinion addresses only one of the two exceptions asserted by the defendant: the “political or newsworthy” exception. Id. at 5. This exception provides that the right of publicity does not require plaintiffs’ permission if their names and likenesses are used in “material that has political or newsworthy value.” Id. (citing I.C. §32-36-1-1(c)(1)(B)). The Supreme Court determined that the term “newsworthy” should not be limited solely to current events, but should be interpreted broadly to include “all types of factual, educational, and historical data…concerning interesting phases of human activity.” Id. at 8. The court determined that defendants’ use of plaintiffs’ information fell within this broad exception. Id. It analogized the defendants’ service to the publication of player names and stats in newspapers and websites across the nation, and reasoned that defendants’ service should not be treated differently simply because they created a new, innovative way to profit off of such publication. Id. at 9.

October 29, 2018

INDIANA SUPREME COURT MODIFIES DECISION TO ALLOW RECOVERY OF COST OVERRUNS DURING RATEMAKING CASE

by Parr Richey Frandsen Patterson Kruse LLP

On June 20, 2018, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld a narrow interpretation of the Transmission, Distribution and Storage System Improvement Charge (“TDSIC”) statute in NIPSCO Industrial Group v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co., 100 N.E.3d 234 (Ind. 2018). A summary of that case can be found here: https://www.indianabusinesslawyerblog.com/nipsco-industrial-group-v-northern-indiana-public-service-co-100-n-e-3d-234-ind-2018/.

On September 25, 2018, the Indiana Supreme Court reissued their opinion in response to a rehearing on the issue. The modified opinion is largely identical to the opinion issued in June. The TDSIC statute allows for periodic rate increases to cover 80 percent of the approved cost estimates for an improvement project without going through the traditional ratemaking process. The remaining 20 percent of improvement costs are recovered through the next general rate case filed by the utility with the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (“Commission”). The Supreme Court modified the June opinion to add a clause clarifying that any cost overruns incurred during a TDSIC improvement project that are “specifically justified by the utility and specifically approved by the Commission” are also recoverable during the next general rate case filed with the Commission in addition to the remaining 20 percent of improvement costs. 100 N.E. 3d at 244.

Jeremy Fetty is a partner in the law firm of Parr Richey with offices in Indianapolis and Lebanon. Mr. Fetty is current Chair of the Firm Utility and Business Section and often advises businesses and utilities (for profit, non-profit and cooperative) on regulatory, compliance, and transactional matters.

October 24, 2018

BE SPECIFIC: ILLINOIS CASE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE IN PLEADING STANDARDS – “WEBB v. FRAWLEY: 7TH CIRCUIT EMPHASIZES THE IMPORTANCE OF PLEADING STANDARDS IN RECENT ILLINOIS CASE”

by Parr Richey Frandsen Patterson Kruse LLP

The success of litigation depends not only on the facts of a case, but also how a case is pleaded. A seemingly meritorious claim can be dismissed where the claim is not carefully and deliberately plead to the court. This is especially true where a plaintiff’s claim involves an element of intent or fraud. The 7th Circuit reinforced the importance of meeting Federal pleading standards when it dismissed a recent Illinois case for failure to properly allege intent and fraud.

Jefferies LLC is a securities and investment banking firm that was looking to get into the trading of precious metals futures. Webb v. Frawley, No. 18-1607 (7th Cir. 2018) at 2. In 2010, Defendant Frawley left his job as a precious metal trader at Newedge USA, LLC, to become the global head of metals trading at Jefferies. Id. Frawley convinced two other Newedge employees, Beversdorf and Webb, to leave and join him at Jefferies. Id. After they did so, Newedge sued Jefferies for poaching its employees. Id. at 3. Soon after receiving notice of the suit, Jefferies issued a policy stating that no precious metal futures would be traded while Newedge’s lawsuit was pending. Id. Frawley knew of this policy, but nevertheless he instructed Webb and Beversdorf to continue trading iron ore futures without informing them that Jefferies would not fulfill their trades under to its new policy. Id. at 4. Webb and Beversdorf eventually found out that none of their trades for iron ore futures were being fulfilled by Jefferies. Id. But it was too late, and both Beversdorf and Webb were fired due to their “poor performance and lack of production.” Id. at 5.

Both Beversdorf and Webb brought claims for tortious interference with contract and common-law fraud claims against Frawley. Frawley removed both suits from Illinois state court to the Northern District of Illinois. Id. at 6. The court eventually dismissed Beversdorf’s claim, finding that he had signed a form which compelled arbitration. Id. at 7. However, Webb did not sign an equivalent form, and thus his claim was allowed to proceed. Id. Frawley then moved to dismiss Webb’s claims. Id. The district court granted Frawley’s motion to dismiss, finding that Webb failed to state a claim for tortious interference with contract under Rule 12(b)(6), and that Webb’s common-law-fraud claims did not meet the heightened pleading standards for fraud under Rule 9(b). Id. Plaintiff appealed on both claims.

October 15, 2018

ENERGY LAW – SEVENTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT PUBLIC UTILITY’S USE OF “SMART METERS” DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNREASONABLE SEARCH

by Parr Richey Frandsen Patterson Kruse LLP

On August 16, 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued an opinion holding that the use of digital “smart meters” by a public utility constitutes a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as well as the Illinois Constitution.

After receiving a grant from the U.S. Department of Energy to modernize its electrical grid, the City of Naperville replaced analog residential energy meters with digital “smart meters.” Unlike analog meters, which typically provide a single lump figure of electricity usage once per month, smart meters record consumption information much more frequently, so the data shows the amount of electricity used in a home at the time it is used. A group of concerned citizens sued, arguing that the smart meters reveal intimate personal details of customers, such as when the customers are home, their sleeping routines, and so on, and that the city’s collection of such data constitutes an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment and the Illinois Constitution. The district court denied two of the group’s complaints, and the group requested leave to file a third complaint, but the district court denied the request because it found that the complaint would be futile because it could not plausibly allege a violation of either the Fourth Amendment or the Illinois Constitution. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of the leave to file a third complaint, holding that while the use of smart meters by Naperville constitutes a search, the search is reasonable and therefore permitted under the Fourth Amendment.

Upon appeal, the Court applied the Kyllo test, which dictates that when the government uses technology not in general public use to explore details of the home that would have been otherwise unknowable, that surveillance constitutes a search. The Court found that the use of smart meters constitutes a search under the Kyllo test because the smart meters yield sufficient data to draw inferences about the activities taking place within the home. Furthermore, the Court said that smart meters are only used by part of a highly specialized industry, and such technology is neither widely available nor routinely used by the public.

September 17, 2018

FERC Legal — Arkansas Public Service Commission v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission US Court of Appeals for District of Columbia Circuit No. 16-1305 (Argued 1/19/18)

by Parr Richey Frandsen Patterson Kruse LLP

On June 1, 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit declined to review an order issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) holding that an operating company that withdrew from a “multi-state energy system” had to continue sharing benefits from a settlement with the other system members, even after it withdrew from the system.

In 1951, six companies from Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, and Mississippi formed the Entergy Corporation, a publicly held utility company intended to share the costs and benefits of generating and transmitting power. The system agreement provided members the option to withdraw so long as the member gave an eight-year notice. Entergy Arkansas announced on December 19, 2005 that it intended to withdraw on December 18, 2013. In 2008, Entergy Arkansas settled state litigation against Union Pacific, which included a below-market rate for coal delivery as part of the settlement. Under the system agreement, all members realized some of the increased costs as a result of Union Pacific’s breach of contract, and they also realized the benefits of the reduced rate following the settlement.

In 2009, FERC approved both withdrawal notices, and held that neither Entergy Arkansas nor Entergy Mississippi should have to pay an exit fee to the other members. FERC held in subsequent proceedings that the settlement benefits should be allocated among the members and adopted a methodology for doing so.

September 6, 2018

NIPSCO Industrial Group v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co., 100 N.E.3d 234 (Ind. 2018)

by Parr Richey Frandsen Patterson Kruse LLP

On June 20, 2018, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld a narrow interpretation of the Transmission, Distribution and Storage System Improvement Charge (“TDSIC”) statute, which allows utility companies to seek approval from the Indiana Utilities Regulatory Commission (“IURC”) for specific transmission, distribution and storage system improvements and to raise rates periodically to recover the costs of the improvements as they are completed. The TDSIC statute was enacted in 2013 to encourage utilities to replace aging infrastructure without having to undergo the full ratemaking process and to recover the costs of the improvements as they were completed.

There are two types of proceedings under the TDSIC statute—Section 9 and Section 10. The Section 10 proceeding is the initial proceedings where a seven-year plan for eligible improvements, including cost estimates, is submitted and reviewed by the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (“IURC”). Once the plan is approved by the IURC, the utility may petition under Section 9 for periodic rate adjustments to recover 80 percent of capital expenditures for eligible, completed improvements. As a part of the Section 9 proceedings, the utility must also update the seven-year plan with the IURC. Furthermore, if the utility seeks to recover additional costs above the initially approved cost estimates, the utility must provide justification for the increase, and the IURC must approve the additional cost recovery.

At issue in this case was a seven-year plan filed by the Northern Indiana Public Service Company (“NIPSCO”) seeking approval for an improvement to its gas system under the TDSIC statute from the IURC. The Section 10 petition identified specific improvement projects for the first year, but for the remaining six years, the plan described “project categories” rather than identifying specific projects, because NIPSCO knows from historical data that a certain percentage of its systems will fail annually and need replacing (referred to as “ascertainable criteria”), but it cannot identify exactly which parts of its system will fail. The IURC approved the Section 10 petition and subsequent Section 9 petitions. The NIPSCO Industrial Group (“Industrial Group”) intervened to oppose NIPCOS’s fourth Section 9 petition because it updated the gas plan with an increased cost of $20 million, but the IURC approved it because the petition further identified specific projects and asset replacements within the project categories approved in the Section 10 petition.

July 16, 2018

INDIANA SUPREME COURT HOLDS IURC IS A PROPER PARTY TO APPEALS OF IURC ORDERS

by Parr Richey Frandsen Patterson Kruse LLP

On June 27, 2018, the Indiana Supreme Court issued an opinion establishing that the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (“Commission”) is a proper party to an appeal of a Commission order. Hamilton Se. Utils., Inc. v. Indiana Util. Reg. Comm’n, No. 93A02-1612-EX-2742, 2018 Ind. LEXIS 496, at *1-12 (Ind. June 27, 2018). Interestingly, the Commission had participated as a party in appeals of its orders without controversy until relatively recently, when parties began to challenge its standing to be a party in several appellate proceedings

This matter began in September 2015 when Hamilton Southeastern Utilities, Inc. (“HSE”) requested a rate increase from the Commission. HSE sought an 8.42% increase in rates, but the Commission only authorized a rate increase of 1.17%, partially because the Commission said that HSE should eliminate outsourcing expenses. Id. at *3-4. HSE appealed the order, initially naming the Commission as a party. HSE then moved to dismiss the Commission, claiming “it had mistakenly identified the Commission as a party” and that the Commission should not be a party because it had “acted as a fact-finding administrative tribunal.” Hamilton Se. Utils., Inc. v. Indiana Util. Reg. Comm’n., 85 N.E.3d 612, 617 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). The Court of Appeals granted the motion, reasoning that the Commission had adjudicated a rate case where the parties appearing before the Commission advocated for competing interests, and the Commission’s order “should speak for itself, without the need to further rationalize its decision.” Id. at 619. The Court of Appeals went on to affirm a number of the Commission’s decisions in calculating the 1.17% increase, but it held that the Commission arbitrarily excluded outsourcing expenses from that rate calculation. Id. at 626.

The Supreme Court granted transfer to review the question of whether the Commission was a proper party to the appeal of its order. The Court held that it was a proper party because it is a “long-standing custom and practice” to treat the Commission as a proper party to appeals of its orders, and the legislature had acquiesced to that practice. Hamilton Se. Utils., Inc, 2018 Ind. LEXIS 496, at *6.The Court noted that other “similarly situated executive branch agencies enjoy the ability to defend their decisions on appeal, both through explicit legislative directive” and through “legislative acquiescence to custom and practice.” Id. at *8. Furthermore, the Court said that public policy supports allowing the Commission to defend its orders on appeal in the interests of not disturbing a long-standing custom, promoting efficiency in the appeals process, and allowing the Commission to adequately represent its interests since opposing parties in a ratemaking case do not necessarily represent all of the Commission’s interests in defending its order. Id. at *10. Finally, the Court noted that the Commission’s role in the ratemaking case is administrative, not adjudicative, and therefore HSE’s argument that the Commission could not be a party because it adjudicated the proceedings failed. Id. at *11.